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‘Criminal lawyers focus on the traditional sphere of ‘real crime’ – roughly equating 
to those offences requiring proof of mens rea or fault – whilst treating regulatory 
offences of strict liability, often enforced by specialist agencies rather than the public 
police, as a marginal and, perhaps, embarrassing exception to the general methods 
and principles of criminal law’. (Lacey 2004, p. 144) 
‘Regulatory criminal law is all but ignored by most criminal law texts and journals’. 
(Chalmers and Leverick 2014, p. 75) 
 
Introduction 
In examining the contours of the penal complex, lawyers, penologists and 
criminologists are often drawn to traditional ‘real crime’ (homicides, violent 
assaults, organised crime, sexual offences, requirements of mens rea and actus 
reus, and general defences) whilst ignoring regulatory offences which are often 
enforced by specialist agencies. They have tended to be preoccupied with the 
punitive regulation of the poor―a project closely tied to a police-prosecutions-
prisons way of knowing―that focuses on ‘crime in the streets’ rather than 
‘crime in the suites’ (Ashworth 2000; Braithwaite, 2003). As Scott (2010) 
notes: ‘[L]egal professionals schooled largely  in appellate decisions relating to 
indictable offences, but also a broader society and media, [are] interested and 
often obsessed with homicide, sexual offences, robbery and theft.  Much of the 
teaching of criminal law in universities also shares this focus’ (p. 64). The 
narrow exclusivity of this approach is a mistake because regulatory criminal law 
is becoming increasingly influential, not least because criminalisation is now 
more than ever viewed as a panacea for almost any social problem. More and 
more we are witnessing the increasing and extensive use of regulatory strategies 
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by the Irish state. In areas such as competition law, environmental protection, 
health and safety law, and consumer and corporate affairs, there has been a 
move towards using criminalisation as the last-resort strategy when compliance 
through negotiation and monitoring has failed.  
 
Distinctions have traditionally been drawn between regulatory crimes and 
ordinary crimes on the basis that the former are mala prohibita (prohibited 
wrongs) and the latter are mala in se (moral wrongs). Regulatory crimes, it was 
suggested, should be thought of in ‘instrumental means-ends terms’, as not 
embodying quasi-moral ‘values such as ‘justice, fairness, right, and wrong’ 
(Lacey 2004, p. 145) They were viewed as a ‘quasi administrative matter’ that 
did not attract significant moral opprobrium or stigmatise those convicted 
(McAuley and McCutcheon 2000, p. 341). It has also been argued that 
regulatory crimes are more likely to be victimless (or at least not have a readily 
identifiable victim). Thirdly, it is suggested that regulatory offences for the most 
part do not embody a punitive or sanctioning model of justice, preferring 
instead to favour compliance strategies.  
 
The main argument of this chapter will be that understanding the differences 
between criminal and regulatory offences along these lines no longer makes 
sense, particularly given the changing nature and perception of security risks, 
and the emergence of more ‘networked governance’ strategies that employ civil, 
administrative and regulatory mechanisms alongside criminal law instruments. 
This extended, somewhat fluid, institutional arrangement is very different from 
the traditional bifurcated representation of wrongs in either civil or criminal 
harms, two almost mutually exclusive formal processes with their own ways of 
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knowing and handling conflicts. In The King v Kidman
1
  Griffiths J explained 
the dichotomy as follows:  
‘In primitive societies there is no distinction in principle between criminal 
and civil actions. In more developed societies the redress of civil wrongs 
is in practice required to be sought by the party aggrieved, while in the 
case of violations of the law entailing penal consequences the 
proceedings are instituted in the name or on behalf of the sovereign 
authority.’  
 
Unfortunately the latter conceptualisation remains in the ascendancy, as evident 
in many criminal law textbooks and syllabi. It is time to abandon traditional 
divisions of this kind which have so structured our thinking and teaching. The 
teaching of criminal law should be extended beyond a focus on a relatively 
narrow taxonomy of offences and contestable principles - such as subjective 
culpability - to incorporate regulatory criminal wrongdoing. Rather than being 
afforded exceptional or epiphenomenal status, its extensive use, infrastructural 
arrangements and modes of operation requires us to reconsider the purposes, 
principles and boundaries of criminal law, and how it is taught.   
 
Public Protection 
Our ordinary criminal justice system is founded on the notion that public 
protection and security are ‘essential goods’ that are necessary for our self-
preservation, well-being, and happiness. This is hardly contentious. Most people 
would agree that we need a system of justice that will enable us to flourish and 
go about our lives free from the threat of injury or harm (such as robberies, 
rapes, assaults, burglaries, etc). What is striking, however, is that the perception 
stills exists in Ireland that regulatory crime does not threaten our security in the 
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 (1915) 20 CLR 425 at 437, as quoted in Van Krieken 2006, p. 1.  
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same way that street crime does. This is a fallacy. Though it may appear more 
remote, more victimless and may often be less dramatic, misconduct in the 
banking and corporate sectors, in the workplace, in the environment, and in the 
distortion of competition in the market poses as much, if not more, of a threat to 
our everyday lives as ordinary crime (with the potential to impact on more 
people). Our security can be affected in a myriad of different ways by 
misconduct of this nature including, among other things, workplace injuries, 
loss of jobs, loss of reputation and the consequent devaluation of share prices 
and pension funds, threats to the environment, increased taxation, and increased 
costs for consumers.  Habermas noted that our legal system needs to move away 
from ‘personal references and towards system relations’ (2008, pp. 432-435). 
These include: ‘protection from environmental destruction, protection from 
radiation poisoning or lethal genetic damage; and, in general, protection from 
the uncontrolled side effects of large technological operations, pharmaceutical 
products, scientific experimentation, and so forth’ (Habermas, 2008, pp. 432-
435). Most criminal law syllabi in Ireland continue to focus on ‘personal 
references’– assaults, homicides, sexual offences, criminal damage - and remain 
rooted in ‘crime in the street’ harms to individuals. By ignoring the ‘systems 
risks’, they facilitate a very narrow understanding of what constitutes a threat to 
our security, fastened to a very traditional outlook that views regulatory 
wrongdoing as having rather benign effects. This outlook remains deeply 
embedded, despite increased awareness of the threat posed. For example, as far 
back as 1984, the Whitaker Committee estimated that the losses incurred 
through white-collar crime in Ireland were more than ten times the value of all 
stolen property recorded by the Gardaí (Kilcommins et al 2004, p. 131). More 
recently, the Chief Executive of anti-corruption agency Transparency Ireland 
John Devitt noted:  
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Ten years ago, it was estimated that Ireland was losing about €2 billion a 
year to white collar crime and that doesn’t take into account the cost of 
the criminality in our banks prior to the collapse of the economy. In spite 
of the huge cost of fraud and corruption to taxpayers, this problem has 
never been, and still isn’t, a high priority for the Government.2  
 
Criminal law modules that continues to focus exclusively on crime in the street 
offences as the paradigm of criminal law perpetuate a narrow construction of 
security risks posed in society, and also fail to capture the increasing 
criminalisation of all kinds of regulatory wrongdoing.  
 
Compliance and Sanctioning strategies  
One of the principal difficulties with only teaching criminal law through a 
‘police-prosecutions-prisons’ prism is that it assumes that sanctions are a point 
of first resort for all types of offending behaviour. Though such an assumption 
works well in relation to most serious ordinary crime, it does not properly 
capture the possibilities available in respect of regulatory wrongdoing where 
there is an emphasis on promoting  an entrepreneurial spirit. Compliance rather 
than sanctioning techniques will often be called for in this setting. They are 
orientated towards persuasion and dialogue, and are designed to promote good 
working relationships (Hamilton 2010, p. 17; Lynch-Fannon 2010, p. 127; 
Macrory, 2008). A sanctioning approach to all regulatory wrongdoing would, it 
is argued, have very negative consequences:  
‘…it undermines the coercive power of the criminal law, dilutes its 
expressive power, over-deters otherwise desirable business activities, 
conflates blameworthiness with imprisonment, creates incentives for 
prosecutors to abuse their powers, fuels an appetite for enhancing prison 
terms, increases social costs and punishes people for actions that in some 
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instances are not even civil wrongs, let alone undertaken with the taint of 
moral wrongfulness.’ (Gopalan 2010, p. 2) 
It can also be argued that if the cost of imprisonment is the same for offenders 
with different earning capacities, imprisoning those with very high earning 
capacities is a waste of social capital, especially if the objectives of 
incarceration can be achieved through other means. (Gopalan 2010, p. 2) 
 
There is significant merit in the adoption of compliance strategies. The line 
between poor business decision-making and criminal activity is far from clear 
cut. Moreover, white collar crime is hard to detect because it often occurs in 
private, behind closed corporate doors. It is also the case that proof is difficult in 
these cases, and often resource intensive.  It is for this reason that area of 
regulatory crime still, by and large, remains predominantly orientated towards a 
compliance model of enforcement (McGrath, 2015). This is facilitated by a 
wide range of strategies that favour the employment of negotiation, consultation 
and persuasion, rather than an exclusively sanctioning approach that would 
potentially polarize the various parties involved. These strategies include audits, 
warning letters, notices, injunctions, guidance, binding directions, and the 
suspension and revocation of licences (O’Neill 2008; Appleby 2010). As Scott 
(2010) has recently noted: 
The enforcement strategies of enforcement agencies have been arrayed in 
a pyramidal approach to enforcement in which the object is to maintain as 
much enforcement activity as possible at the base of the pyramid.…This 
approach is said to be effective not only with businesses which are 
orientated to legal compliance, but also with the ‘amoral calculators’ for 
whom compliance becomes the least costly path when they know there is 
a credible threat of escalation to more stringent sanctions. (p. 73) 
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The nuances and circuits that run through this pyramidal structure - with 
compliance at the bottom and sanctioning at the apex - is not currently captured 
in criminal law syllabi in universities in Ireland. It is in this regard quite one 
dimensional and divorced from the ‘action’ and practice of criminal law. It also 
fails to capture the breadth of criminal law purposes.  A compliance model of 
justice, for example, speaks primarily to the ‘good man’ who seeks to act in 
good faith and employs the law as a normative guide to conduct and action, and 
not to the ‘bad man’ who seeks to evade the strictures of the law. In order to 
encapsulate both forms of conduct, the compliance model must also be 
supported by a sanctioning model which can act as a platform for the expression 
of collective outrage. The criminal law is designed to uphold moral sensibilities 
and it permits a powerful message to be conveyed in relation to the anger felt by 
ordinary citizens about the commission of certain crimes. It also acts as an 
important safety valve, limiting the ‘demoralising effects’ on society of the 
consequences of serious misconduct (McGrath 2012, p. 72; Robinson 2014).
3
  
 
Traditionally it had been said that the focus of the sanctions for many of these 
regulatory offences was more ‘apersonal’ in nature than their ordinary 
counterparts. The argument was that ‘these were not real crimes to which 
stigma should attach, but were rather in the nature of administrative regulations 
with non-stigmatising penalties such as fines’ (Lacey 2004, p. 161). The 
traditional lack of a mens rea requirement operated as the ‘doctrinal marker of 
these defendants less than fully criminal status from a social point of view’ 
(Lacey 2004; Baldwin 2004).  But regulatory agencies have increasingly grown 
considerable teeth as regards prosecution. For example, Section 78 of the 
Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act, 2005 now imposes on conviction on 
                                                          
3
 See DPP v Duffy and Duffy Motors (Unreported, Central Criminal Court, 23
rd
 March 2009); DPP v Manning 
(Unreported, High Court, 9th February, 2007); DPP v. Paul Murray [2012] IECCA 60; Paul Begley v. DPP 
[2013] IECCA. 
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indictment for an offence under the Act a fine not exceeding €3 million or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or both. On conviction on 
indictment for competition law offences, undertakings are liable to a fine not 
exceeding whichever of the following amounts is the greater, namely €5 million 
or ten per cent of the turnover of the undertaking in the financial year ending in 
the 12 months prior to conviction. Individuals are subject to the same fine limits 
and/or a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years. Further, following an 
extensive review by the Company Law Review Group and the Director of 
Corporate Enforcement of the several hundred criminal offences contained in 
the Companies Acts, the Companies Act 2014 now creates a four-tier 
categorisation of company law criminal offences in Ireland. This categorisation 
encompasses the majority of criminal offences. Both Category 1 and 2 offences, 
may be prosecuted summarily or on indictment and when prosecuted on 
indictment category 2 offences are punishable by a fine of up to €50,000 and/or 
imprisonment for up to five years and category 1 offences will be punishable by 
a fine of up to €500,000 and/or a sentence of imprisonment of up to ten years. 
The apex of the pyramid now occupies a space which views regulatory 
wrongdoing as ‘real crime’, with serious individual consequences. In late March 
of 2009, McKechnie J., in a judgment in the Central Criminal Court which 
considered competition law abuses by an association of Citroen car dealers, 
noted:  
‘These [offences] stifle competition and discourage new entrants, 
damaging economic and commercial liberty…[T]hey remove price 
choice from the consumer, deter consumer interest in product purchase 
and discourage variety. They reduce incentives to compete and hamper 
invention…If previously our society did not frown upon this type of 
conduct, as it did in respect of more conventional crime, that forbearance 
or tolerance has eroded swiftly, as the benefits of competition law 
become clearer…Therefore it must be realised that serious breaches of 
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the code have to attract serious punishment [which included 
imprisonment]’.4   
 
Governance 
Criminal law teaching remains predominantly focused on offences that are 
pursued exclusively by centralised policing (the Gardai) and prosecuting 
authorities (Director of Public Prosecutions).  This tends to ignore the 
emergence of new mechanisms and modes of governance for dealing with 
criminal wrongdoing.  Since the 1990s, we have increasingly witnessed the 
extensive use of regulatory criminal and civil strategies in areas such as 
competition law, environmental protection, health and safety law, and consumer 
and corporate affairs (Scott 2010, p. 69). These strategies are supported by a 
wide range of criminal sanctions available summarily and on indictment. 
Durkheim neatly captures this expansion in criminalisation, juxtaposing it with 
the decline in severity in penal punishments:  
‘Seeing with what regularity repression seems weaker the further one 
goes in evolution, one might believe that the movement is destined to 
continue without end; in other words, that punishment is tending towards 
zero…For there is no reason to believe that human criminality must in its 
turn regress as have the penalties which punish it. Rather everything 
points to its gradual development; that the list of acts which are defined 
as crimes of this type will grow, and that their criminal character will be 
accentuated. Frauds and injustices, which yesterday left the public 
conscience almost indifferent, arouse it today and this insensitivity will 
become more acute with time.’ (Durkheim 1992, pp. 46-47) 
 
The emergence of this regulatory criminal framework is significantly different 
from the unified monopolies of centralised control underpinning policing and 
prosecution in the modern State. Arguably these new techniques and strategies 
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can be seen as part of a pattern of more, rather than less, governance, but taking 
‘decentred’, ‘at-a-distance’ forms. Prior to the nineteenth century, the institution 
of local policing was heavily orientated towards the ‘creation of an orderly 
environment, especially for trade and commerce’ (Braithwaite 2005, pp. 13-14).  
It did not focus exclusively on offences against persons and property, but also 
included the regulation of ‘customs, trade, highways, foodstuffs, health, labour 
standards, fire, forests and hunting, street life, migration and immigration 
communities’ (Braithwaite 2000, p. 225). Throughout the nineteenth century, 
however, the State very gradually began to monopolise and separate the 
prosecutorial and policing functions, particularly for serious crimes. In terms of 
policing, this meant that uniformed paramilitary police were preoccupied with 
the punitive regulation of the poor to the almost total exclusion of any interest in 
the constitution of markets and the just regulation of commerce, became one of 
the most universal of globalised regulatory models.  
 
From the mid-19th century, factories inspectorates, mines inspectorates, liquor 
licensing boards, weights and measures inspectorates, health and sanitation, 
food inspectorates and countless others were created to begin to fill the vacuum 
left by constables now concentrating only on crime. Business regulation became 
variegated into many specialist regulatory branches (Braithwaite 2005, pp. 15-
16).  In Ireland, these specialist agencies included the Bacon Marketing Board, 
the Irish Tourist Board, the Racing Board, the Health Authorities, CIE, Bord na 
gCon, and the Opticians Board. Similarly during the course of the nineteenth 
century conflicts were no longer viewed as the property of the parties most 
directly affected. Previously strong stakeholder interests in the prosecution 
process, such as victims and the local community, were gradually colonised in 
the course of the nineteenth century by a State apparatus which acted for rather 
than with the public.   
11 
 
 
Now, however, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions is, to some 
extent, increasingly losing its monopoly role. The number of administrative 
agencies that have entered the criminal justice arena, colonising the power to 
investigate regulatory crimes in specific areas and to prosecute summarily, has 
increased dramatically in Ireland in recent years. They include: the Revenue 
Commissioners, the Competition Authority, the Director of Consumer Affairs, 
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Health and Safety Authority, and the 
Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement. Significantly, these agencies 
have both investigative and prosecution functions, with each pursuing their own 
agendas, policies and practices. Moreover, very wide powers of entry, 
inspection, examination, search, seizure and analysis are given to some of these 
agencies (Considine and Kilcommins 2006).
5
  
 
 All of this represents more criminal regulation by the State (as well as of the 
State), rather than any ‘hollowing out’ of the State. This enlargement in scope, 
however, is fragmented in nature, occupying diverse sites and modes of 
operation. Despite extensive powers to share information, there is no unifying 
strategy across the agencies or with other law enforcement institutions such as 
the DPP or Gardaí.
6
 Staffing levels, resources, workloads and working practices 
vary from agency to agency. Indeed, and apart from respective annual reports, 
there is little in the way of an accountability structure overseeing the policy 
choices of the various regulatory agencies, the manner in which they invoke 
their considerable investigative and enforcement powers, or the way in which 
information is shared between them and with the Gardaí. 
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 See section 64 of the Health and Safety Act, 2005; section 779 of the Companies Act 2014. 
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 Irish Police Force. 
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Another striking feature of this regulatory infrastructure is the proliferation of 
hybrid enforcement mechanisms that can be employed by the agencies or, on 
occasion, by private parties. These mechanisms have also contributed to a more 
general ‘blurring of legal forms’ (Ashworth 2000, p. 237),  conflating the 
functional distinctions that exist between criminal and civil law, and between 
regulatory wrong-doing and ordinary wrong-doing (McGrath, 2015).  For 
example, and apart from the possibility of a criminal prosecution by the 
Competition Authority, private parties can seek to initiate civil enforcement of 
competition law. Indeed, the Competition Authority itself can also seek to bring 
a civil action. . Similarly, the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement 
can take civil or criminal enforcement actions. Civil enforcement actions 
include the use of restriction and disqualification orders. This fragmentation in 
responses to a breach of a regulatory offence can give rise to difficulties having 
regard to the principled protections generally afforded to those accused of 
crime. The potential for blurring of the boundaries, for example, was addressed 
by the Irish Supreme Court, In the Matter of Tralee Beef and Lamb Ltd (In 
Liquidation) Kavanagh v. Delaney & ors
7
, in which it described a restriction 
order, which prohibits a person from being involved in the management of a 
company for five years, as highly stigmatising and “gravely damaging to the 
reputation of a person thus afflicted”. This would accordingly need to be taken 
into account in any subsequent criminal sentencing decision relating to the same 
misconduct. 
 
Causation  
One of the difficulties of teaching criminal law with a focus on a relatively 
narrow range of offences is that it implicitly paints a picture of the types of 
persons committing crimes. It will inevitably contain a ‘disproportionate 
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number of those who are poor, uneducated and unskilled’ (McCullagh 1995, pp. 
411-412). Criminal law teaching can in part help inculcate a set of attitudes 
towards the legal system in society, exhorting in particular its legitimacy on the 
basis of its neutral nature, whilst ignoring the underlying structural inequalities 
of power which are imbricated in the cross-currents of society. The ideology of 
objectivity, egalitarianism and the strict application of rules can mask and 
mystify law’s partiality, particularly its capacity to preserve and maintain the 
status quo for those in power (Horrowitz 1992, p. 266). As Norrie (2001) 
suggests: ‘The cunning of the law lies in its ability to mask the one-sidedness of 
its instrumental content through its formal character as a logic of universal 
individualism’ (p. 23).  Hiding behind the ‘false consciousness’ of  black-
letterism are the variety of hierarchical interests that it serves. Apart from legal 
education (Kennedy 1990, p. 45),   this also has implications for legal practice, 
particularly the notion that what lawyers actually do is apolitical and 
independent, merely following the inner technical logic of the law. This might 
be reassuring, but it is a denial of the political and social realities of legal 
practice: 
[B]lack-letterism works as a convenient mode of denial. It enables legal 
academics and lawyers to engage in what is a highly political and 
contested arena of social life – namely, law – and to pretend that they are 
doing so in a largely non-political way. The main advantage of this is that 
they can go about their daily routines without assuming any political or 
personal responsibility for what happens in the legal process. However, 
the insistence that lawyering is a neutral exercise that does not implicate 
lawyers in any political process or demand from scholars a commitment 
to any particular ideology is as weak as it is woeful. Such an image is a 
profoundly conservative and crude understanding of what it is to engage 
in the business of courts, legislatures and the like. (Hutchinson 1999, p. 
302) 
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In addition to difficulties with the portrayal of criminal law as neutral and value 
free, criminal law teachers can, in excluding regulatory crime from the 
curriculum, implicitly construct a very narrow view of criminal typology, giving 
the impression that it is only certain socio-economic classes that commit crime. 
The crimes of the powerful remain at the margin of attention. This is in spite of 
considerable change in criminological discourse in relation to White Collar 
Crime and State Crime. Edwin Sutherland (1949), for example, is reported to be 
the pioneer of white collar criminology. He suggested in the 1940s that white 
collar crime was ‘a crime committed by a person of respectability and high 
social status in the course of his occupation’ (p. 9), thus challenging the 
stereotypical assumptions about all crime being committed by the lower classes. 
He went on to note that the ‘…financial cost of white collar crime is probably 
several times as great as the financial cost of all the crimes which are 
customarily regarded as the ‘crime problem…’ (Sutherland 1940, p. 5). More 
significantly, Sutherland also emphasised the impact of such crime on society:  
‘The financial loss from white collar crime, great as it is, is less important than 
the damage to social relations. White-collar crimes violate trust and therefore 
create distrust, which lowers social morale and produces social disorganisation 
on a large scale. Other crimes produce relatively little effect on social 
institutions or social organisation’ (pp. 11-12). A key point for Sutherland was 
to emphasise the idea that white collar criminality was real criminality. It may 
not feature in debates about the crime problem or on the law and order agenda, 
but this was a mere labelling matter: ‘…white collar criminality differs from 
lower class criminality principally in an implementation of the criminal law 
which segregates white-collar criminals administratively from other 
criminals…’ (ibid). 
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Paradigmatic Criminal Law 
At a more technocratic level, many aspects of regulatory crime operate in 
opposition to the general trend of paradigmatic criminal law which permits 
general defences, demands both a conduct element and a fault element, and 
respects procedural standards such as a legal burden of proof beyond reasonable 
doubt. Pure doctrines of subjective culpability and the presumption of 
innocence are increasingly abandoned within this streamlined regulatory 
framework to make up for difficulties of proof in complex cases.  The 
increasingly instrumental nature of criminal legal regulation is evident, for 
example, in the introduction of ‘reverse onus’ provisions that require the 
accused to displace a presumption of guilt.
8
 The system of justice that applies in 
the regulatory realm is thus more exculpatory in orientation than its ordinary 
criminal counterpart. It is also evident in the instrumental fault element 
requirements of criminal regulation. The attachment of subjective mental 
element to wrongdoing in conventional criminal law is often severed in the 
regulatory criminal arena where objective standards of culpability apply.
9
 
Moreover, any defences that might exist in the regulatory area are also more 
specialised than might be the case in the general defences that apply in criminal 
law. For example, in competition law, it is a specific defence to show that the 
agreement, decision or concerted practice complained of, benefited from a 
declaration from the Competition Authority that the practice complained of 
contributes to improvement in the production or distribution of goods and 
services; or promotes technical or economic progress. Similarly some of the 
general duties placed on employers under the 2005 Safety, Health and Welfare 
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 Section 271(2) of the Companies Act 2014, for example, provides that where the defendant was aware of the 
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at Work Act are qualified by the term ‘reasonably practicable’. This means that 
employers have exercised all due care when, having identified the hazards and 
assessed the risks at their workplaces, they have put into place the necessary 
protective and preventive measures, and where further measures would be 
grossly disproportionate (having regard to unusual, unforeseeable and 
exceptional circumstances). 
 
Aside from reverse onus provisions, the privilege against self-incrimination may 
also give rise to difficulties, particularly given the hybrid enforcement 
mechanisms that many agencies employ. This is something that Irish legislators 
are increasingly grappling with as regulatory practices become more 
embedded.
10
  In Re National Irish Bank,
11
 for example, inspectors were 
appointed under the Companies Acts, 1990 to examine the affairs of National 
Irish Bank. Section 10 of the Act placed a duty on officers of the company to 
cooperate with inspectors and to produce documents and answer questions. 
Section 18 provided that an answer given by a person ‘may be used in evidence 
against him’. In the Supreme Court it was held that section 10 did not allow 
evidence obtained in such circumstances to be admitted in a subsequent 
criminal trial as it would breach the constitutional right of an accused party not 
to incriminate himself or herself. Section 29 of the Company Law Enforcement 
Act 2001 subsequently immunisesd the answers given to an authorised officer 
from being used in any subsequent criminal proceedings.
12
 Another difficulty is 
the emphasis that the law traditionally places on oral testimony. This may 
sometimes pose a dilemma in the arena of regulatory wrongdoing where 
documentary trails may form a central part of an investigation. Though the 
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Criminal Evidence Act, 1992 provides for an inclusionary approach to 
documentary evidence in criminal proceedings, this has not as of yet been 
extended to civil proceedings. 
13
 
 
In defining a crime
14
, the Irish courts have adopted a very traditional approach, 
emphasising indicia such as procedural characteristics (powers of arrest, 
detention, bail etc.), due process safeguards (the presumption of innocence, the 
right to liberty, the right to a jury trial), and punitive elements. As McGrath 
notes, these:  
‘…features are often associated with traditional criminal offences. This 
analysis has marginalised corporate criminality, often enforced by 
regulatory law, from the crime debate… [The Irish] cases speak to real 
crime so attempting to make conventional crime indicia fit into regulatory 
contexts is inappropriate. The jurisprudence needs to be re-evaluated and 
a new approach must be found.’ (McGrath 2010, p. 60-61) 
 
Employing instrumentalist reasoning can also give rise to difficulties, 
particularly in relation to constitutional justice and due process safeguards. 
These difficulties have manifested themselves in relation to the imposition of 
administrative sanctions;
15
 definitions of a crime and double jeopardy;
16
  the 
privilege against self incrimination;
17
 the  burden of proof;
18
 proportionality of 
sentencing;
19
 and mens rea requirements.
20
 As these regulatory criminal 
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practices become more embedded, they are increasingly tested in the courts 
given their instrumental desire to maximise efficiency, enhance control and 
minimise risk. The flow of power into these civil and regulatory spheres is 
challenging for a due process system that emphasises the primacy of individual 
rights. The institutionalised nature of accused rights has ensured that they 
cannot be easily ‘trumped for collective policy reasons such as risk 
management, security and public protection (Dworkin 1977, pp. 93-4). They 
remain very much part of the topography in the Irish criminal process, carrying 
a ‘threshold weight’ ‘which the government is required to respect case by case, 
decision by decision’ (Dworkin 1988, p. 223). 
 
When due process and regulatory values and outlooks meet, as they increasingly 
do, it makes for an interesting battleground, a site for struggle and competing 
claims about security, instrumental effectiveness, governance, and liberal 
principles. These tensions are often however not captured in criminal law 
teaching which continues to perpetuate the myth of regulatory exceptionalism 
(usually in relation to strict liability offences only).  The practice and operation 
of regulatory criminal law needs to be more fully embraced to highlight its 
growth and the tensions its creates for a traditional criminal law model rooted in 
an 1861 Offences against the Person conception of wrongdoing.  
 
Information sharing and mandatory reporting  
Current criminal law teaching often assumes that investigation and prosecution 
of any ‘crime conflict’ is the exclusive preserve of centralised police and 
prosecution force. Prior to this, the old system of law enforcement was heavily 
reliant on a network of rewards, victims, thief-taking and accomplice driven 
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prosecutions. In an industrialised setting, this system of enforcement was 
increasingly viewed as a ‘badly regulated system of power’ (Foucault 1991, p. 
79). The state increasingly in the course of the nineteenth century began to 
monopolise investigative and prosecutorial functions, and to enforce the law on 
behalf of the ‘people’. As much as possible recourse would not be had to local 
networks; where these practices continued – for example with informants – they 
were downplayed. The centralised state apparatus – as expressed through the 
police and public prosecutors – thus completely monopolised the crime conflict. 
Commitment to this way of doing justice still informs criminal law teaching in 
Ireland. Though it remains largely true of the investigation and prosecution of 
‘ordinary’ offences, it fails to adequately capture new circuits of information 
gathering in the regulatory sphere. New regulatory approaches are beginning to 
throw up investigative and prosecutorial networks that in part rely on 
information gathering beyond the traditional reach of the police and prosecution 
agencies.   
 
What appears to be emerging in recent years is the increasing adoption of a 
more variegated approach straddling both civil and criminal jurisdictions to the 
detection, investigation and punishment of offences. For example, the 
organisational make-up of the Criminal Assets Bureau comprises Revenue 
Commissioners, Department of Social Community and Family Affairs officials 
and Gardaí, all directing their respective competencies at proceeds from 
criminal activities. More specifically, legislation increasingly permits 
authorities including the Competition Authority, An Garda Síochána, the 
Revenue Commissioners, the Insolvency Service of Ireland, the Director of 
Corporate Enforcement and the Irish Takeover Panel to share information with 
each other.  In some instances individuals are required to become ‘information 
reporters’ (Horan 2011, pp. 1529-1540). Auditors, tax advisers, lawyers, 
20 
 
accountants and liquidators are all bound by various statutory   requirements to 
report information to relevant authorities.
21
   Very broad and generic obligations 
to disclose information have also recently been enacted.
22
  
 
The difficulties of prosecuting regulatory crime are well documented. In 
addition to facilitating exchange of information and compelling certain parties 
to become information reporters, the authorities are increasingly also seeking to 
protect and encourage witnesses to come forward and provide evidence. 
‘Whistleblowers’ have been crucially important in Ireland on lifting the lid on 
various abuses such as the care of the elderly and corruption in banks. 
Encouraging such witnesses to provide information ordinarily takes two forms: 
protection
23
 and/or immunity. The Protected Disclosures Act 2014, for example, 
provides extensive protection for public sector workers in Ireland   in respect of 
wrongdoings such as health and safety threats, misuse of public monies, 
mismanagement by a public official, damage to the environment, or 
concealment or destruction of information relating to any of the foregoing. The 
Competition Authority, in conjunction with the office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, also operates a Cartel Immunity Programme, which provides 
immunity from criminal prosecution for suspected individuals who are willing 
to cooperate and testify on behalf of the prosecution (Gorecki and McFadden 
2006, pp.631-640; Talbot 2015, pp. 178-181). 
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All of this involves a trend away from a hierarchical command and control 
apparatus of State policing. As Bayley noted: ‘[This involves] the 
reconstruction of criminal justice in decentralised ways so that it responds to 
local needs, reflects local morality, and takes advantage of local knowledge 
Bayley 2001, pp.211-212). It constitutes a new form of ‘networked governance’ 
involving the increasing ‘regulation of civil society’ (Crawford 2006, pp.449-
479). It stands in marked contrast to the traditional view that criminal law and 
prison  isolates a small group who can be controlled, ‘a delinquent milieu, 
closed in upon itself, but easily supervised’ (Foucault 1991, p. 281). Criminal 
law, under this style of governance, forms part of a ‘hybridisation of techniques’ 
(Rose 2008, p. 142), that involve ‘a multiplication of possibilities and strategies 
deployed around different problematisations in different sites and with different 
objectives’ (Rose 2008, p. 240).   
 
Conclusion 
It is clear that the traditional preoccupation in criminal law syllabi with well-
accepted forms of criminal activity (e.g. assault, theft, murder, sexual offences), 
to the exclusion of regulatory crime, promotes a myopic vision of criminality 
amongst students. When students do not learn about regulatory crime alongside 
“real crimes” their understanding of regulatory crime as less harmful and less 
threatening is re-enforced. Given the available evidence of the threat posed to 
society by “systems risks” and the proliferation of regulatory offences in recent 
decades, a criminal law syllabus which focuses exclusively on traditional 
criminal offences fails to paint a complete picture for students.   Moreover, their 
learning is fragmented as their understanding of this form of criminal activity is 
relegated to learning within commercial or company law context where the 
appreciation of this activity as a crime is lost. Particularly problematic in this 
regard is the failure to teach students how our traditional understanding of the 
22 
 
structure of criminal offences (requiring conduct and fault elements), criminal 
defences and procedural safeguards differ when applied to regulatory crime. A 
departure from the traditional approach to exploring the contours of the criminal 
law is required, encompassing the broad sweep of offences and enforcement 
agencies and recognising the variegated approach to the detection, investigation 
and enforcement of offences in the twenty-first century.  
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